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Introduction:
"This Damnable Paradoxe"

A damnatio memoriae followed the death of Akhenaten. His
son-in-law reverted to the religious beliefs that had lain under ban and
persecution. The Egyptian monarch's massive granite sarcophagi and alabaster Canopic chest stood unused. His body was either interred in a
secondhand coffin or torn to pieces and thrown to the dogs. His capital
stood abandoned to the desert, never again to serve as a royal residence and
only to be recovered from the sands thousands of years later by German and
English archaeologists in the decades surrounding the World Wars. The
Ramessides of the succeeding dynasty worked out this obliteration, even
excluding Akhenaten and his immediate progeny from the king-lists of
Egypt. Whenever possible the symbols and figures of the hated Pharaoh
were erased from monument and stele. His name was execretion. If reference
had to be made to his reign, he was characterized in a circumlocution as
"that criminal of Akhet-Aten."1 For his had been a regime, described by his
successor, Tutankhamun, in which
the temples of the gods and goddesses from Elephantine [down] to the
marches of the Delta [had . . . and] gone to pieces. Their shrines had
become desolate, had become mounds overgrown with [weeds]. Their
sanctuaries were as if they had never been. Their halls were a footpath.
The land was topsy-turvy, and the gods turned their backs upon this land.
If [the army was] sent to Djahi to extend the frontiers of Egypt, no success
of theirs came at all. If one prayed to a god to seek counsel from him, he
would never come [at all]. If one made supplication to a goddess similarly,
she would never come at all. Their hearts were hurt in their bodies, (so
that) they did damage to that which had been made.2
The repudiated monarch is indicted not for heresy, as has been so often and
so mistakenly alleged, but for an antitheism in which he opposed the other
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gods of Egypt in favor of Aten, the Sun-God, an antitheism that led to a
divine abandonment of the nation as all "the gods turned their backs on this
land."
What this stele inscription decried as impiety and antitheism, however,
successive generations read as religious advancement. For the scandal of
Akhenaten, his true originality, lay with his uncompromising solar monotheism. Egypt had flourished for fifteen hundred years in religious peace
through the assimilation of tribal cults into its hospitable pantheon. Hundreds of animalic heads perched on human bodies with a multiplicity that
bespoke their origins, and a tendency to identify one with another indicated
a strong drift toward monotheism or at least syncretism. Akhenaten brought
that tendency to fulfillment not by assimilation, but by repudiation and
proscription. The one god was the solar disk; the others were discarded and
suppressed. Their temples were unsupported, their priests ignored, their
names hammered away. Directives were issued for the plural form of the
word god to be eradicated wherever it appeared.3 The capital was moved
from Thebes to El-'Amarna, and the site was rebuilt into the new city named
Akhetaten to celebrate the Sun-God.
In a lyrically lovely hymn, Akhenaten worshiped Aten, the solar disk, as
the "sole God, like whom there is no other! Thou didst create the world
according to thy desire, whilst thou wert alone: all men, cattle, and wild
beasts, whatever is on earth, going upon (its) feet, and what is on high, flying
with its wings."4 His successors and even more the next dynasty judged that
such a worship and such a king had turned Egypt seni-meni, "passed-byand-sick."5 It had deprived the nation of its temples, the army of its
victories, and the people of its recourse to the divine. In the middle of the
fourteenth century B.C., as the eighteenth dynasty ran its course, Egypt
made the collective judgment: monotheism was antitheism. The denial of the
gods of the people destroyed the living presence of any god.
A thousand years later, in 399 B.C., Socrates drew from Meletus that sam
easy equation between the gods of popular belief and all divinity. Forensic
theology had divided Athens since Anaxagoras of Clazomenae had introduced philosophy into this center of Hellenic culture. Anaxagoras had been
indicted under the city's decrees against those "who do not believe in the
divine or who teach logoi about matters transcendent" and had fled for his
life to Lampsacus.6 A bronze tablet displayed on the Acropolis publicly
proscribed Diagoras of Melos, and a reward of one talent was posted for
those who would kill him and two talents for those who would bring him
captive into Athens. Diagoras was an "atheist." Indeed, his fame was to rank
him among the great classic atheists in the ancient world, with his name
heading the canonical catalogues of the godless. The tablet explains his
atheism: he had ridiculed the Eleusinian Mysteries and spoken about what
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occurred within them.7 Around the same time, 415 B.C., Protagoras of
Abdera was reportedly banished from Athens and his book burnt in the
agora for theological skepticism: "About the gods, I do not have [the
capacity] to know, whether they are or are not, nor to know what they are
like in form; for there are many things that prevent this knowledge: the
obscurity [of the issue] and the shortness of human life."8 Whatever solid
ground of actual event and word lies beneath the mist and haze of story,
allegation, and maxim surrounding Anaxagoras, Diagoras, and Protagoras,
Athens was never the territory of untrammeled inquiry that the Enlightenment projected. It was protective of its gods, and Meletus accused Socrates
of denying them.
Initially, Meletus denounces Socrates for corrupting the city's youth "by
teaching them not to believe in the gods in which the City believes, but in
other daimonia that are new." With breathtaking ease, Socrates induces
Meletus to identify this indictment with a total denial of any divine reality:
"This is what I say, that you do not believe in gods at all. . . ." "Do I believe
there is no god?" "You certainly do not, by Zeus, not in any way at all."
Socrates is TO jragajtav a6eog, completely godless.9 Meletus associates him
with Anaxagoras in the conviction that the sun is only a stone and the moon
is only earth. Socrates finds the general charge of atheism so absurd that he
treats Meletus like a jester, one who like Aristophanes features serious issues
in the corruptingly inappropriate medium of flippancy. Socrates had taken
the direction of his life from the revelation of Delphi and its negative
governance from his daimon. His life was to be lived as "the god stationed
me, as I supposed and assumed, ordering me to live philosophizing and
examining myself and others."10 If he had abandoned this station, then with
some assurance one could have discerned disbelief in his conduct, since out
of fear of unpopularity and death he would have disobeyed the divine
directions given him by the oracle. The ambiguity of "atheism" in the
Apologia stems essentially from the identification of the gods of the city with
all gods, of an understanding of divinity accepted within one society with
any understanding of the divine. Ironic as this identification might have
seemed to Plato's Socrates, it resulted in the tragedy of his execution. One
man's theism proved to be his indictor's atheism, the incarnation of impiety.
Socrates also introduced another factor into atheistic discernment: the
differentiation of levels of confession between true and specious religious
belief. Meletus insists upon an obvious profession that corresponds with the
acknowledgment of the gods of the city; Socrates offers a quality of commitment in life that indicates actual conviction. Meletus does not attend to
practice; Socrates collapses any ultimate distinction between theory and
practice and makes practice an embodiment or instance of theory. This
added consideration does not center on the kinds of gods who are
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worshipped, but on the difference between inauthentic and authentic confession, a distinction that the works of Plato broadened into the differentiation
between the apparent and the real, between the phenomena and the truth of
the phenomena. Plato did not distinguish, as he has been continually and
facilely dismissed as distinguishing, between two different and independent
worlds, the world of appearance and the world of ideas—as if these were two
autonomous spheres. He does distinguish between the apparent and the
form that is the truth of the apparent. There are not two worlds, but the
imperfect phenomenon and its perfect truth now grasped in the modes of
religious affirmation and denial. Socrates' discernment insisted both upon
the differences among gods and upon the differences among the levels of
knowledge.
The early opposition to Christianity would be unintelligible outside this
ambiguity. Justin Martyr's First Apology, written at Rome in the middle of
the second century, recognized the charge made against the Church, now a
little over a hundred years old: "Thus we are even called atheists [aOeoi]. We
do confess ourselves atheists before those whom you regard as gods, but not
with respect to the Most True God."11 Christians absented themselves from
state temples and from common cults; they refused the recognized acts of
reverence to imperial symbols and to the statues of the gods whom they
called idols. Thus they stood apart from the cities and from the festivals
which marked social religious life; at the same time, they were not assimilated into the Jewish nation. The scandal of such a refusal is hard to
recapture, but it led the early Christians to the same indictment as that of
Socrates. They were obviously atheists, despite the appeal that Justin, as so
many of the apologists before and after him, lodged: "What sensible person
will not admit that we are not atheists, since we worship the Creator of this
world and assert, as we have been taught, that He has no need of bloody
sacrifices, libations, and incense."12 It is little wonder that the early Christians found in Socrates a common heritage and postulated Moses as his
influence. The same charge that had led to his death introduced their
centuries of persecution. Both philosophic convictions and religious commitments suffered the charge of atheism.
Akhenaten was never called an atheist, but he was described as such.
Socrates was called an atheist but rebutted the charge. Justin Martyr was
called an atheist and admitted the sense in which that indictment was true.
These three figures expose the paradoxical history of a continually ambiguous term. Irenaeus accepts the term as applicable to Anaxagoras, but
Augustine celebrates Anaxagoras' belief "that the author of all the visible
world is a Divine Mind" and places him with the great natural theologians of
antiquity. 13 Cicero, Sextus Empiricus, and Claudius Aelianus drew up lists
of the atheists, but their indices covering so many centuries bear the same
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internal contradictions as the histories from which they draw. 14 Never do
those named in the catalogues or in the remarks of others come to more than
ten. Seldom would one of those so named admit the justice of the title; even
more rarely would subsequent historians of philosophy insist upon it.
Diogenes of Apollonia, Hippon of Rhegium, Protagoras, Prodicus, Critias,
Diagoras of Melos, Theodore of Gyrene, Bion of Borysthenes, Euhemerus
and Epicurus: almost always their "atheism" was an alien, unsympathetic
reading of their theism or their natural philosophy. Too little is known
about most of them, naturalists, sophists, and skeptics, to assert much with
certitude. The naturalists won the name because they made air or water the
primary substance, but Diogenes, like Anaxagoras, attributed Mind to his
primary substance and identified it with Zeus, and Hippon was listed by
Clement of Alexandria among those who were given the name of atheist
without deserving it.15
A sophist, a politician, and a Cyrenaic won the name because they
investigated the origin of the divine names: Prodicus of Ceos found that
Hephaestus was a synonym for fire in Homer and thar the Nile was
worshiped as the source of life in Egypt. Linguistic analysis discovered that
the term divinity was predicated in its original usage of that which is
beneficial to humanity. Some in Athens found this atheistic, but others
defended it as historically accurate and as profoundly insightful in identifying the divine with the universally beneficent. 16 Critias of Athens placed in
the mouth of Sisyphus, in the satyric play by the same name, another
explanation for the origin of religion. It arose not from the experience of
beneficence, but from the primitive experience of limitless human exploitation. Laws by themselves do not eliminate crime; they only encourage
secrecy in its commission. So a "wise and clever man invented fear for
mortals. . . . He introduced the Divine, saying that there is a God flourishing with immortal life, hearing and seeing with his mind, and thinking of
everything and caring about these things. . . . And even if you plan anything
evil in secret, you will not escape the gods in this/' 17 Sisyphus enunciated for
the first time in Western civilization a political or social motivation for the
origin of the gods. On the other hand, there is no reason to ascribe to Critias
the opinion which he put into the mouth of his shifty protagonist; in fact,
the location and the character of the speech should indicate the distance
between its judgment and that of the author of the play.18 Euhemerus,
finally, never denied the gods. He asserted in his book of travels that the
heavenly bodies were divine but that many of the popular gods were great
men whose achievements earned their divinization after death.19 Epicurus
asserted the existence of the gods; indeed, he so asserted their happiness that
he excluded from them any providential care for the human condition.20 For
Diagoras, Theodore, and Bion, and perhaps one or two more, the case was
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different: their atheism consisted neither in whom they identified as divine
nor in what they characterized as divine activity, that is, in how they defined
the gods. Diagoras' 'Anonvgyitpvies Aoyoi attacked any divine existence.21
Theodore's On the Gods submitted them to a searching criticism and final
denial, Bion initially denied their existence but underwent conversion before
his death.22
Greek philosophic history, then, exhibits the enormous paradox of
"atheism/* The word could carry vastly divergent and even contradictory
meanings and could consequently be applied to figures whose ideas were
radically opposed. But its history does more than embody the ambiguity of
the term; it also exhibits something of the anatomy of the ambiguity. Men
were called atheists dependent upon a limited number of variables: whom
they identified as gods; the understanding they gave to the term; the
activities they defined as divine; the kind of denial attributed to them. Any
of these factors could tell critically in the attribution of atheism. A naturalist
could most easily be identified as an atheist by the first factor; the sophist
and the mythographer by the second; the atomist and the superstitious by
the third; the agnostic and the antitheists by the last. In other words, the
ambiguity of atheist is the classic indeterminacy that the Platonic tradition
held was true of any linguistic unit, of any word: ambiguity about the
appropriate instance, the appropriate definition, and the appropriate word,
with all of these framed within varying degrees of knowledge, the kind of
affirmation or denial, the difference between appearance and reality, the
definition and the word. The term atheist is not hopelessly vacuous, but
unless the instance to which it is applied and the meaning in which it is used
are determined, its employment is profoundly misleading.
The Platonic tradition maintained that ambiguity characterized any word
or any instance or any definitional articulation. The word does not define
itself, and the individual case does not explain itself. The need for the dialectical method lies precisely in the discontinuity among these three, and the
movement of the dialectical conversation is toward their resolution, toward a
coincidence of word, thought, and thing. Thus the author of the Seventh
Epistle could summarize the elements and procedures of any method:
For each of the things which are, there are three necessary means through
which knowledge is acquired. Knowledge itself is a fourth factor. And the
fifth, it is necessary to posit, is the thing itself, that which is knowable and
true. Of these, the first is the name [ovouxx], the second is the definition
[Xoyog], the third is the image [ei&coXov], and the fourth is the knowledge
[£matrJH'T)]. W you wish to understand what I am now saying, take a single
example and learn from it what applies to all. There is [5] that which is
called a circle, which has for its [1] name the word we have just men-
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tioned; secondly, it has a [2] definition, composed of names and verbs:
"that which is everywhere equidistant from the extremities to the center"
will be the definition of that which has for its name "round" and
"spherical" and "circle." And in the third place, there is [3] that which is
being drawn or erased or being shaped on a lathe or destroyed—but none
of these processes affect [5] the real circle, to which all of these other
[circles] are related, because it is distinct from them. In the fourth place,
there is concerning these [4] knowledge [ejtiOTT]fiY]] and insight [voOg] and
true opinion [dXr]6f|s te 56§a], and these must be assumed to constitute a
single whole which does not exist in either vocal sounds or in bodily
forms but in souls. Thus it is clear that it [4, knowledge] differs from [5]
the nature of the circle itself and from [1,2, 3] the three factors previously
mentioned.23
No sensible person confuses the three physical or external means or factors
that enter into the generation of knowledge.
The Seventh Epistle affords a very good instance of three expressive
factors which must enter into any movement toward knowledge: [3] instance, [2] definition, and [1] word: To confuse [5] the circle that one [4]
understands with [3] this particular circle that is being shaped on the lathe
would deny all universal knowledge; to identify [5] the circle with the words
of its [2] definition would fail to see that [1] words are always indeterminate
apart from [3] instance, and that a [2] general definition never perfectly fits
its [3] imperfect and phenomenal realizations; to seize upon the [1] word as
if it were without divergent [2] definitions and contradicting [3] applications
is to reduce language to sophistry and invective. The three must be coordinately present and grasped: word, articulated meaning, and imperfect realizations. Otherwise there is no knowledge. Knowledge itself may range from
opinion to science to intuition.
What holds true in so simple an example of geometry becomes even more
telling in the history of ideas. This Platonic enumeration identifies the
elements which constitute the culture: the words we use, the understanding
they are given within this use, and the stories, legends, persons, events, and
theories in which they are appropriately used. Culture, the achievements of
the past, is irreducibly linguistic. Whatever the kind of language, in culture
the inner word has become the outer word, and this outer word remains to
be read, assimilated, and interiorized in another generation's inner word.
The terms that run through intellectual history exhibit all the indeterminateness cited by this Platonic epistle against written or literary philosophy.
These units do not keep a constant meaning. They function more like
variables than constants in intellectual history. Nature, substance, person,
and principle vary essentially in their meanings and in their applications in
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various philosophic or theological systems. To ask what is nature, outside
such a context of relationships, is to ask a meaningless question. To assert
that the notion of cause can no longer be admitted may evoke solid feelings
of metaphysical rectitude, but this statement carries little but pathos when
taken apart from a context of discourse in which it makes sense. The
problem of language, though exhibited in language, is not simply linguistic,
however.
It is equally, and perhaps more profoundly, a problem of thought, of the
grasp of meaning and of the world. For thought exists only within language,
whether this language be expressed vocally or remain in the inner verbum:
"Thinking and discourse are the same thing, except that what we call
thinking is, precisely, the inward dialogue carried on by the mind with itself
without spoken sound."24 The history of ideas can be formulated only if
these ideas emerge as words; the history of terms can be illuminating only if
this intrinsic unity between thinking and speaking is maintained. Expression
is not artificially added to thought. Thought only takes place within inner
expression, within an inner word, of which either written or oral discourse
can properly be called an emanation. 25 External expression is not identical
with thought. Our expression may be more than we understand or realize; it
may also be inadequate to our thought. Both are possible. "That is not what
I meant." "But it is what you said." And again: "In telling me that, he had
no idea how much he was revealing about the matter." External word and
concept are not identical, and a text can obtain a life of its own. But language
is not external to concept; it is literally its ex-pression. There is no thinking
without correlative expression. In terms of the Platonic triad, a definition is
given in terms of names and verbs.
But the last member of the external triad is the single instance (eibeoXov) to
which it may refer, by which it may be exemplified, or in which it may be
realized, however imperfectly. The instance embodies the meaning and
carries the language in discourse, or it is the particular from which the
universal can be induced or by which the word is judged in its appropriateness. The instance, "the case in question," is so critically important in the
clarification of meaning that, above either word or meaning, it exhibits the
intelligibility of that which is the object of discourse. It is not enough to have
the word justice singled out as a unique term; the greater the instance of
justice—as in the polis rather than the individual person—the more readily
an exact meaning for it is discernible. 26
Word, definition, and instance: knowledge must cover each of these, form
them into a single whole. Knowledge in some lesser degree of perception or
opinion can begin with any of them, for each is an expression—a limited
expression—of the reality which one is attempting to reach in inquiry.
Any inquiry into an aspect of atheistic affirmation encounters all the
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twisted contradictions that the Seventh Epistle noted in the path toward
knowledge. The word atheist presents unique problems. It occurs almost
exclusively in a polemic context; it is the designation of another person; it is
invective and accusation. It rides into the quarrels of human beings as the
term heretic functioned in Europe's Middle Ages or as the word fellow
traveler terrified the United States in the middle of the twentieth century.
Those who were called heretics insisted almost universally that they represented genuine and purified belief; few of those branded as fellow travelers
characterized themselves as such. So also a9eoc;. It is a brand imprinted by
one's enemies. Its definition is parasitic; like any denial, it lives off the
meaning denied. The amphibologies it gathers to its history are a product of
the hostile interpretation of unsympathetic critics. As it occurs in Greek
antiquity after names such as Anaxagoras or Epicurus, atheism denotes a
denial not of all transcendent personal divinity but of popular gods, the
figures of civic legend and preference. Thus, the use of the epithet is dictated
by the definition of the gods denied or by the instances of those to whom
worship is offered or refused.
"Atheism," then, exhibits in a double manner the indetermination embodied in each member of the Platonic triad. The name, the definition, and
the instance both of the god or gods and of the "atheism" that constitutes
their denial are undetermined. This sixfold ambiguity is increased almost
beyond hope when one recognizes the forensic context in which all six
occur, the passions that are engaged and the recriminations that are easily
called into play. For, unlike the Platonic example of the circle, the affirmation or denial of god touches something so deep and so basic within human
experience that it involves radical drives for meaning, for unity within
experience, for final security, for autonomous freedom and self-determination—longings which have run through human history and choice.
If one begins with the term atheist" the promiscuity of its definition and
application is evident from its first use in England. To Sir John Cheke, first
Regius Professor of Greek at Cambridge, seems to belong the honor of its
introduction.27 In 1540 Cheke translated into Latin Plutarch's On Superstition^ in which both superstition and atheism are condemned, but with
different evaluations: the atheist thinks there are no gods, while the superstitious man, haunted by fear, "though by inclination Atheist, is yet far too
weak-minded to think about the gods what he wishes to think. And again
Atheism is in no way responsible for Superstition—Whereas Superstition
has both supplied the cause for Atheism to come into being, and after it is
come, furnished it with an excuse."28 In Plutarch, atheism seems the mistake
of the brave and superstition the conviction of the coward. In an essay
appended to his translation, Cheke strove to redress the balance. His was an
attack on the atheist, but atheism conceived as a denial not of the existence of

10

Introduction

god but of the interventions of providence, an atheism that traces itself back
to Epicurus and Lucretius and that finds its practical, political embodiment
in Machiavellianism.
Books were coming out by the gross against atheism in England, which is
not so strange if one remembers the report made to Lord Burleigh in 1572 in
Carlton's Discourse on the Present State of England: "The realm is divided
into three parties, the Papists, the Atheists, and the Protestants. All three are
alike favoured: the first and second because, being many, we dare not
displease them; the third, because, having religion, we fear to displease God
in them."29 Walter, Earl of Essex, died in 1576 seeing only religious ruin:
"There is nothing but infidelity, infidelity, infidelity, atheism, atheism,
atheism, no religion, no religion."30 Twenty years later, Thomas Nashe's
"Christs Teares over Jerusalem" would find the atheists everywhere: "There
is no Sect now in England so scattered as Atheisme. In vayne doe you
preach, in vayne doe you teach, if the roote that nourisheth all the branches
of security be not thorowly digd up from the bottome. You are not halfe so
wel acquainted as them that lyue continually about the Court and City, how
many followers this damnable paradoxe hath; how many high wits it hath
bewitcht."31 Cheke was not alone in his refutation of "this damnable
paradoxe." In 1530 John RastelPs New Boke of Purgatory took up the gage.
Roger Hutchinson's Image of God or Layman's Book (1550) identified the
group that had "already said in their hearts, There is no God'; or that they
may easily be brought thereunto," with the radical religious sects closely
akin to the Anabaptists. Perhaps no one surpassed the rhetorical zeal of John
Veron's title, Frutefull Treatise of Predestination and Providence . . . against
the Swynysche Gruntings of the Epicures and Atheystes ofOure Time [1561],
lumping together "all the Vayne and Blasphemous Objections That the Epicures and Anabaptistes of Oure Time Can Make."32 John Veron was not
original, but he was straightforward. In general these sallies possessed all the
accuracy of the newly developed musket. For all the powder poured down
the barrel, the shot was wild. What sense could be found in a word that could
cover Machiavelli, Christopher Marlowe, the Anabaptists, and even Thomas
Nashe himself, a word of which the growing influence could be engaged by
men of the religious quality of the Earl of Essex and Lord Burleigh?
During the great controversies at the end of the nineteenth century,
George Jacob Holyoake coined a new term, secularist, to distinguish himself
from those who were called atheists. The distinction was imperative: atheist
was often taken to denote one who is not only without god, but without
morality.33 At the same time, Thomas Huxley created the word agnostic to
distinguish his own skepticism, as well as that of John Tyndall before him
and Clarence Darrow in the next century, from the outright denial explicit in
atheist.34 On the other hand, Charles Bradlaugh maintained the respectabil-
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ity of those called atheists against Holyoake and vowed that he would fight
until the designation atheist was generally accepted in civic life, allowing
atheists to give evidence in court. Upon his own admission into the House of
Commons in 1882, he pulled out a Bible and gave himself the oath of
office.35 Holyoake was the last man imprisoned on charges of atheism or
blasphemy in England, in 1841; Bradlaugh had to defend himself and his
National Reformer in 1868 and 1869 against the charge of blasphemy and
sedition.36 What Nashe called "this damnable paradoxe" runs through the
history of Western civilization. It is difficult to discuss the issue at all. The
ambiguity of name, definition, and instance makes it impossible to give some
determination to the problematic situation, or to leave it to the open-field
running of the sophists or the polemists.
If, taking another route, one begins with the term god instead of atheism,
the same "damnable paradoxe" emerges. Perhaps its paradigmatic embodiment is best exhibited in the various evaluations which have followed the
work of the gentle Jewish genius, Baruch de Spinoza. Spinoza's Ethics
demonstrated the existence of god; the term pervades his treatise, building
finally into an understanding of life in which human "blessedness is nothing
but the peace of mind which springs from the intuitive knowledge of God,
and to perfect the intellect is nothing but to understand God, together with
the attributes and actions of God that flow from the necesity of His
nature."37 Yet this is the same Spinoza whom Pierre Bayle, usually detached
and sophisticatedly distant from any dogmatic assertions, introduced in his
Historical and Critical Dictionary as "a Jew by birth, and afterwards a
deserter from Judaism, and lastly an atheist. . . . He was a systematic
atheist."38 The name of God was not in question—both Spinoza and his
subsequent critics treated the name with reverence—but the definition.
Spinoza's first public biographer, John Colerus (Kohler), put the issue
squarely: Spinoza "takes the liberty to use the word God, and to take it in a
sense unknown to all Christians."39 For this reason, despite the piety with
which his name is surrounded, Colerus and Diderot in the Encyclopedic and
Hume in his Treatise of Human Nature could speak of the "true atheism . . .
for which Spinoza is so universally infamous."40 The abbe Claude Yvon, in
the extended article on atheisme in the Encyclopedic, used Spinoza as the
archetypal atheist, turning the issue of the existence of God into a contest
between Bayle and Spinoza.41 On the other hand, Novalis celebrated Spinoza
as "ein Gottrunkener Mensch" while Lessing, Herder, and Goethe spoke of the
religious sentiment which his work evoked in them.42 The Pantheismusstreit, in
which Moses Mendelssohn defended Spinoza against his critics, did not end
the controversy; perhaps its most rhapsodic moment came when Ernest
Renan hailed Spinoza's achievement, claiming, "The truest vision ever had
of God came, perhaps, here."43
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To heap enigma upon ambiguity, Friedrich Nietzsche wrote to Franz
Overbeck in 1881 that he recognized in Spinoza his precursor. Three years
before, however, at the age of sixteen, Vladimir Sergeyevich Solovyov had
begun his acquaintance with Spinoza's writings, and he credited them with
his return to the Christian faith he had abandoned. In "The Concept of
God: In Defense of Spinoza" (1897), Solovyov, one of the greatest Russian
philosophers, theologians, and ecumenists of the nineteenth century, wrote,
"The concept of God, which the philosophy of Spinoza gives us, in spite of
all its incompletion and imperfection, nonetheless responds to the primary
and indispensable demand of a genuine idea and thought of God. Many
religious people have found spiritual support in this philosophy."44 The
"atheism" of Spinoza obviously depends upon two distinct, but related,
hermeneutical events: how one reads his text and how one interprets god.
This ambiguity of god and its definition inevitably involves ambiguity of
instance, of what is either called "god" or should be characterized as theistic
denial. The ironic comment of Harry Austryn Wolfson before a Harvard
congregation touched heavily upon this point. Drawing upon his knowledge
of the movements of philosophy, this great reflective scholar centered on the
new instances of what is called "god" and hence the salvation of religion:
Nowadays, lovers of wisdom are still busily engaged in the gentle art of
devising deities. Some of them offer as God a thing called man's idealized
consciousness, others offer a thing called man's aspiration for ideal values
or a thing called the unity of the ideal ends which inspire man to action,
still others offer a thing called the cosmic consciousness or a thing called
the universal nisus or a thing called the elan vital or a thing called the
principle of concretion or a thing called the ground of being. . . . I
wonder, however, how many of the things offered as God by lovers of
wisdom of today are not again only polite but empty phrases for the
downright denial of God.45
Wolfson is not denying the existence of an idealized consciousness, a human
aspiration for ideal values, or elan vital. He is questioning whether any or all
of these instances can supply—even in an imperfect realization and existence—either an image or a subject of which the name god can be legitimately predicated. The reduction of the divine to any of these instances
seems to be a covert form of denial. On the other hand, Whitehead and the
process theologians who followed him characterized the principle of concretion as "god," and Paul Tillich founded his three volumes of Systematic
Theology on god as the ground of being.
With god identified by Tillich as the furthest reaches of life, the atheist
becomes correlatively understood as one who says that life has no depth,
that it is shallow. The atheist affirms this in complete seriousness; otherwise
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he is not an atheist.46 Friedrich Jodl's Vom Lebenswege takes up the human
aspiration for ideal values as divine and contends: "Only the person without
ideals is truly an atheist."47 With so attenuated an understanding of what
legitimizes a predication of "god," atheism is never in question. "God" has
become so sentimentally amorphous that it admits any statement of meaning, even quite contradictory statements, and can be applied to any treasured
phenomenon or friend behind the phenomenon.
Thus the first function of any inquiry into the origins of modern atheism
is to determine whether one is talking about something at all, whether one
has something definite enough to constitute a problem. The first problem is
not to say something about modern atheism; the first problem is to determine the data and resources enough so that there is something, a subject, to
talk about at all. "This damnable paradoxe" is constituted not simply by
variant predicates attached to the same subject, by unresolved issues about a
common topic. It consists, at least initially, in the name of the subject itself.
For from the history of the terms and their correlative determinations in
meanings and applications to doctrines and persons, a problematic situation
emerges that is long on rhetoric and polemics, but short on the precision, the
care, the seriousness, and the delimitation that allow an aspect of it to
become the source of problem, inquiry, and assertions. The initial question,
before any discussion of origins, dialectical or otherwise, is really quite
simple: What are we talking about? Is it possible to think in some consistent
way about the career of atheism at all? The value of even so cursory an
attention to the history of atheism indicates that this question, simple as it is,
carries complications which stretch back to writings, stelae, and battles at the
beginning of the history of ideas.
The Parameters of the Inquiry
The problem with atheism is that it is not a problem. It is a situation, an
atmosphere, a confused history whose assertions can be identical in expression and positively contradictory in sense. The ambiguity which marks such
terms as god and atheism can be discovered in almost every critical proposition about this situation. Projection, for example, lies at the origin of religion
for both Feuerbach and Freud, but in the Essence of Christianity what is
projected are the lineaments of the perfectly human, while in the psychoanalytic treatment of Freud what is projected is the protecting and threatening
father figure, "so patently infantile, so foreign to reality, that to anyone with
a friendly attitude to humanity it is painful to think that the great majority of
mortals will never be able to rise above this view of life."48 In such an
atmosphere, the first function of inquiry is not to frame its final and
governing question, because the vocabulary in which it would be framed
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would be as ambiguous as the situation out of which it arose. The first
function is to determine if there are any parameters in the historical career of
atheism through which this vague, unsettled, indeterminate situation might
be given consistency and consequence. These, in turn, might suggest the
conditions necessary for understanding it and disclose some of the procedures by which these conditions could be met. Are there any constants in the
history of atheism in Western civilization?
The characteristic of the indeterminate, of any problematic situation, is
that its inner consistency is not apparent. Factors are concurrent or successive without their inner relations being established. Beliefs or implications
become problematic when their emergence seems random or their conditions are hidden. Statements of meaning and truth become impossible when
it is not evident that the phenomenon adequately represents reality or
whether its present career exhibits anything about its future. Progression in
knowledge is towards control, not in the sense of technical use, but in the
sense that wonder or doubt or puzzlement advance toward an adequate
grasp of a state of affairs, as the internal coherence of its material elements
and their formal relationships is determined. Investigation is this development of a chaotic subject from indeterminacy to determination, and the
initial step of this progress lies in discovering those parameters by which the
chaos becomes intelligible.49
Atheism does not stand alone. The term and the persuasions which cluster
around it take their meaning from the divine nature which has been asserted
by the religions and the philosophies, by the superstitious practices and the
mystical experiences of those who adhere to the divine existence. An
essential unity in intelligibility lies between atheism and theism, and if only
the negative moment of this dipolarity receives attention, the problematic
situation remains undetermined. The reflective experience of millennia
demonstrates this. Atheism does not simply displace theism. The conflict
between them is mortal because of their more general unity in meaning. If
the antagonism does not bear upon a single subject, there is no contradiction. Affirmation and denial are only possible if the subject remains the
same.
This subject is determined not by the atheist but by the theist, by the
going beliefs, by the popular gods of the city or what the political and social
establishment has determined as its god, by the sense of the divine which is
the issue of religious or philosophical sensibility and argument, or by the
proclaimed personal god of the monotheistic religions. Any or all of these
can be the object of skepticism, denial, or uncommitted opinions, but
outside these affirmations the correlative negative loses any meaning whatsoever.
Perhaps the first instance of coherence in any attempt to understand
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atheism is this: the central meaning of atheism is not to be sought immediately in atheism; it is to be sought in those gods or that god affirmed, which
atheism has either engaged or chosen to ignore as beneath serious challenge.
The history of the term indicates this constant, and the analysis of its
meaning suggests that it is inescapable: atheism is essentially parasitic.
This is the first parameter in any attempt to transform the vague, unsettled, and indeterminate situation of atheism into a serious question. This
parameter allows the determination of the subject-matter to proceed one
step further. The meaning of atheism is not only fixed by the content of
theism: atheism depends upon theism for all three factors isolated by the
Seventh Epistle. The name, the definition, and the instance for the atheistic
negations are all set by the current theism.
Charles Bradlaugh had insisted upon this dependence:
I am an Atheist, but I do not say that there is no God; and until you tell
me what you mean by God I am not mad enough to say anything of the
kind. So long as the word 'God' represents nothing to me, so long as it is a
word that is not the correlative and expression of something clear and
distinct, I am not going to tilt against what may be nothing-nowhere.
Why should I? If you tell me that by God you mean 'something' which
created the universe, which before the act of creation was not; 'something'
which has the power of destroying that universe; 'something' which rules
and governs it, and which nevertheless is entirely distinct and different in
substance from the universe—then I am prepared to deny that any such
existence can be.
Definition and instance must also come from the prior theological assertion.
One of the many paradoxes inherent in this history is that the point made
centuries before by Justin Martyr for Christianity is retrieved by Charles
Bradlaugh in his battle against it: "The Atheist does not say there is no God,
so long as the word simply represents an indefinite quantity or quality—of
you don't know what, you don't know where: but I object to the God of
Christianity, and absolutely deny it."50 And again: "He did not deny that
there was *a God,' because to deny that which was unknown is as absurd as
to affirm it. As an Atheist he denied the God of the Bible, of the Koran, of
the Vedas, but he could not deny that of which he had no knowledge."51 The
assertions of the theist provide the state of the question for the atheist,
whether that question bears upon the words, the meaning, or the religious
subject. The initial parameter of an inquiry into atheism, then, has multiplied. Theism and atheism are not simply an accidental conjunction, a
successive accumulation of contradictory opinions. A bond of necessity
stretches between them: atheism depends upon theism for its vocabulary, for
its meaning, and for the hypotheses it rejects.
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Does atheism also depend upon theism for its very existence? This pushes
the question of internal coherence one critical step further. Does theism not
only shape, but generate, its corresponding atheism? This was the process in
certain obvious historical movements. The polytheism of the Egyptians
drifted slowly, almost imperceptibly, toward the amalgamation of gods into
the single deity, until this development was frozen by the violent attempts in
the eighteenth dynasty to force its growth. The cruelty and sexual promiscuity of the Hellenic gods evoked skepticism about their existence. Augustine
recorded that the Roman pontiff Scaevola rejected the gods of the poetic
tradition because "such deities cannot stand comparison with good human
beings. One god is represented as a thief, another as an adulterer, and so on;
all kinds of degradation and absurdity, in word and deed, are ascribed to
them."52 When Feuerbach attempted to eliminate any divine reality that is
other than the human person, he argued that the intrinsic contradiction in
Christian doctrine makes such an imagined subject impossible, that atheism
is the secret truth of religion and that the incoherence of Christian dogma
discloses that truth. 53 In all of these instances, atheism depends upon the
content of the god proposed not only for its terms, its significance, and its
adversary, but also for its existence. The internal contradictions within the
nature of god generate its denial. In other words, the relationship with
theism is not only definitional, it is dialectical.
Does that same relationship obtain in modern atheism? Does theism not
only set the meaning, but also generate the existence of the atheism which
emerges in the middle eighteenth century? Is the content of god, the idea of
the divine, so internally incoherent that it moves dialectically into its denial?
Dependence for meaning is one thing; dependence for existence is quite
another.
Any attention to the origins of atheism in the West must attend as
much—if not more—to the theism of the theologians and the philosophers
as to the atheism of their adversaries. Atheism must be seen not as a collation
of ideas which happened to arise in Western thought but as a transition
whose meaning is spelled out by the process and whose existence is accounted for in terms of the ideas which preceded it. To be indifferent to
atheism as a transition is to fix it as an abstraction, and never to understand it
in either its starting point or its ideational context. Even more, it is to fail to
deal with the deeper question which underlies much of the historical
evolution of atheism. If the emergent atheism simply reveals dialectically the
internal contradiction which was lodged within the content of theism itself,
then the understanding of atheism is possible only through the understanding of its generating matrix, theism. One issues from the other; one cannot
make sense unless the other does.
An inquiry into atheism as a serious idea, as a conviction not simply
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reducible to external factors, sociological conditionings, or economic pressures, as a conviction that is taken precisely as a judgment that claims insight
into the nature of reality, must take the meaning of what it treats from those
whose claims are contradictory and must examine the evidence to see
whether it supports a dialectical reading of what is already a relationship of
dependence. In other words, an inquiry into the origins of atheism must
trace the intellectual process from god affirmed to god denied. The content
of one constitutes the content and explanation of the other. For atheism as a
problematic situation possesses a content which is determined by several
critical parameters. Atheism is necessarily dependent upon theism for its
vocabulary, its meanings, and its embodiments. Atheism has often been
dependent upon theism for its evocation and its existence. These parameters
advance the internal possibilities for inquiry significantly because they
indicate its methodological direction. Any study or investigation of the
origin of modern atheism must be equally a study of the theism of the
intellectual world which generated it. Atheism is essentially a transition.
This conviction governs the inquiry in this book. The history of atheism
suggests some of the conditions which are necessary for its understanding
and discloses the futility of the polemics which have been written to counter
its emergence. So strident have both sides become over the past century that
the debate itself has lost a good deal of its previous respectability. The voices
are too impassioned, the side-remarks too clever, the appeal to the audience
too blatant, and the whole quarrel finally sterile. There is no progress in
understanding when philosophic history or theology become tactics.
In order to understand atheistic consciousness, then, it is important to
investigate in some depth that which is proposed as divine. But there is
something further that needs examination besides the content of the divine.
It is the form of thought in which that content appears.
The distinction between content and form figures critically in the history
of human reflection, a theme running through one variation after another.
The Seventh Epistle numbered name, definition, and instance as various,
imperfect embodiments of reality, but also spoke of the forms of thought—
science, insight, and true opinion—by which these three could be grasped,
forged into a unity, and made productive of a highest form of knowledge
that would unite the knower with reality. In the medieval debates over the
existence of universals, the distinction was drawn between the id quod and
the modus quo, the content or essence and the mode of its existence either as
particularized in reality or as universalized in thought. The Hegelian
dialectic maintained that art, religion, and philosophy all have the same
content, the Absolute, but in art it exists in the immediacy of the sensuous
and as an individual object; in religion it exists in the mode of figurative
representation (Vorstellung) and in acts of worship; and in philosophy it
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exists in its own proper form, that of thinking knowledge, as pure thought.
The form is not identified with the content as such in the Platonic Epistle or
in the medieval disputes or in the Hegelian dialectic, and its distinction from
content allows various forms of thought and existence to exhibit similarity in
content.
This does not tell the whole story, however. Content is not the same thing
as form, but content and form are not indifferent to each other; the content
will be significantly affected by the form in which it is cast. The Schoolmen
of the Middle Ages put it in an axiom: "Quidquid recipitur per modum
recipientis recipitur" (whatever is received [content] is received according to
the mode [form] of the one receiving it). Aquinas attributed this insight to
the Platonic tradition: "Plato saw that each thing is received in something
else according to the measure of the recipient.'*54 Human nature exists one
way as a thought and another way as a particular man. Number is abstract as
three and concrete as three cows. So profoundly does the form of thought or
existence tell upon what is thought or upon what exists that for centuries
philosophers have argued the reality of universals and the irretrievable
singularity of each real thing. The content of what is known remains in some
way through the various apperceptive forms of the processes by which it is
known, but that way must be intellectually understood also if thought is not
to be confused with extramental reality. The form in which the content
exists must be concomitantly grasped—even if nonthematically—for it will
tell upon the content. The modes of thought employed determine the truth
or falsity of the statements which are made.
There is nothing all that mysterious in such a parameter. Everyone knows
that the propositions made in a drama carry a different sense from those
made in a physics or history textbook. One expects one kind of truth from
myth, but not the truth of a chronicle. Even if it were possible to frame a
single proposition identical in its formulation for drama, physics, history,
myth, and chronicle, anyone would recognize that the literary form alters
significantly the content of what is said, even if its grammatical structure and
language remain the same. So also form will eventually change the meaning
of an inappropriate content. What is said sarcastically will eventually become hostile, regardless of protestations that "I was only joking." What is
repeated endlessly will eventually become meaningless, regardless of its
intrinsic merit.
This gives our inquiry a third parameter: in considering the transition of
theism into atheism, it is critically necessary to consider not only the content
of the divine that is being negated, but also the form in which that content is
advanced, the mode of thought in which it is given meaning, elaborated in a
method, and grounded in principle. The dialectical movement of the content
into its negation happens not only because of a contradiction lodged at the

Introduction

19

very heart of its own meaning, but also because of a contradiction or
inappropriateness between the content itself and the form in which it is
proposed. The dialectical movement progresses not only toward the internal
coherence of the subject, but also toward the methodological coherence of
the subject with an appropriate mode of thought or pattern of discourse. In
this evolution of understanding, the form of discourse or the mode of
thought will eventually work out its truth in the content. What one thinks
about will eventually take upon itself the shape given by the way one is
thinking.
This parameter is accepted in any philosophic tradition. For Hegel, its
formulation is that "method is the absolute foundation and ultimate
truth."55 In Aristotle, it lies in the affirmation that internal privation is the
unstable condition for movement and change. Method will eventually
produce its idiomorphic, even unexpected, content. Thus it is misleading to
abstract from the working context, whether religious, philosophical, scientific, or literary, in which the necessity of the affirmation or denial of god
appears. Propositions ripped from their context can never be more than an
accumulation of opinions, easily formulated and easily rejected. There is no
thinker whose conclusions cannot be made to seem absurd by the reduction
of his inquiries to a few pages in a "history of philosophy,'* where his
conclusions are listed as if they were a series of idiosyncratic convictions,
and his name placed under such hopelessly misleading titles as "empiricist"
or "idealist." Stunted, parodied, and stamped, he takes his place in a series of
futile predecessors and successors, each one refuting the one who came
before and awaiting in the succeeding generations the turn of opinion against
him.
One can only grasp the seriousness and the universal claim of a conclusion
if the working inquiries have been carefully and methodically retrieved. This
does not mean that the author is simply to be repeated; it does mean that his
work is to be traced and analyzed as a whole. A work which is interpreted
and sequenced by a succeeding generation of thinkers does not remain the
same. The bringing of new questions to these texts, the indexing of them
within their "effective history," that is, within the consequences of their
thought and the history of their influence, the understanding of their latent
power through the traditions which they have fathered—all of these inevitably alter the very works which are the objects of this study. But the
alteration is not distortion any more than it is reproduction. It is interpretation, a new "fusion of horizons" in which the past is made present and the
virtualities of a tradition may be newly discovered. The event of interpretation is an event of understanding, a dyadic relation, in which both the
questioner and the questioned mutually influence one another. "To interpret
means precisely to use one's own preconceptions so that the meaning of the
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text can really be made to speak for us."56 But to be a serious part of that
conversation, the text which gives permanence to the arguments and evidence and to the principles and conclusions by which an idea develops must
be respected in its integrity.
This willingness to enter into the form, the labor of a work, allows it to
achieve its rightful integrity that transcends the random citations of the
pastiche, the accidental, and the final absurdity of oversimplification and
easy dismissal. Atheism is essentially a transition, a movement from the
affirmation of the divine into its negation, perhaps a negation awaiting in
turn its own negation. Whatever its particular history and development, that
transition will never be understood unless it is understood from within, and
this interior knowledge will never be obtained unless the positive and the
negative of the transition are interpreted both for their content and for the
mode of thought in which this content is incarnate. Without this labor, the
content is simplified, misrepresented, and misunderstood, and the dialectical
movement into contradiction becomes only a surface cleverness. The portrait never conies quite into focus, leaving the impression that all has been
polemics and arbitrary choice.
This insistence upon the importance of the mode of thought not only
continues a determination of the problematic situation, rendering the indeterminate increasingly open to investigation, but implies still a fourth
parameter for the investigation. Theism and atheism are not only mutually
dependent in their content and form of argument and hypothetically dialectical in this dependence: they both exhibit modes of thought, which become
in their expression modes of discourse. Amid the divergence of meanings
and applications, and the dependencies and struggles among the proponents
of contradictory positions, they have in common a literary community, a
world of available discourse. The transition into atheism is not only a
generation of negation; it is a literary event, whose progression spells out a
world which remains available long after the agents and actors have passed
on. The atheistic transition is available in this world of discourse, maintaining an independent life, in contrast to the thousand contingencies out of
which it emerged. "Not only is the world 'world* only insofar as it comes
into language, but language, too, has its real being only in the fact that the
world is re-presented within it."57 The modes of thought become concrete in
discourse, however abstract the language, and take on a determined quality
which opens up to even further investigation the problematic situation of
modern atheism. Thus the fourth and final parameter: What theism and
atheism have in common is discourse. For their study a neutral instrument is
needed by which they may be interpreted in their working inquiries and
compared without reducing their pluralism to one mode of thought or
another. Discourse allows for this analysis.
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For discourse itself contains four coordinates which Richard McKeon has
isolated as inherent in any connected pattern of thought: selection, interpretation, method, and principle.58 These coordinates allow a series of questions
to be leveled at any tractate, speech, argument or discursive expression, and a
subsequent relationship to be drawn between one text or inquiry and
another, without either reducing every philosophy to a single true philosophy or regarding all positions as of equal worth because each represents a
different perspective. To ask questions governed by these coordinates is to
look for the values given to certain variables in every discourse. Like an
operational matrix, these four coordinates of discourse will be progressively
clarified as they are employed in the following inquiry, but some formal and
initial discussion of them might be helpful.
Selection is operative because discourse must always be about something.
Selection indicates the fundamental field or area which will provide the
subject-matter and the terms with which the discourse deals. Selection
indicates the radical focus of the discourse, whether that focus converges on
the structure of things or upon the antecedent processes of thought whereby
the structure of things can be known or upon expressions of these thoughts
in language and in action. Philosophical periods differ as the major thinkers
find their fundamental area of disclosure or of inquiry in the nature of things
(a metaphysical selection) or in the structures of cognition (an epistemological selection) or in the nature of language and the implications of actions
(a semantic or pragmatic selection). Selection responds to the question:
What are you fundamentally talking about? What area is fundamental to all
subsequent inquiry? It is usually indicated by the kind of categories which
are operative in the discourse. A semantic selection would allow Gilbert
Ryle to have categories of words, varieties of the types of propositionfactors that could complete certain "sentence-frames" without absurdity;
an epistemological selection would indicate that the categories of Kant's
Critique of Pure Reason would be deduced from the kinds of logical
judgments deduced as the a priori conditions for all judgments because they
make possible the syntheses inherent in experiential knowledge; a metaphysical selection would turn Francisco Suarez's Disputationes metaphysicae
to a consideration of the categories of being, rather than of judgments or of
words. Every discourse must have a focus or area of inquiry which is
fundamental to all others. Selection characterizes what that focus or area is.
Interpretation addresses the second question about any discourse: What
allows something to be said about the subject? How can statements or
propositions be formed that are more than tautologies? This introduces the
coordinate of interpretation since all judgments and all prepositional
knowledge involve an interpretation of a subject-matter. Propositions are
made or terms predicated according to what is finally real within the
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discourse. Selection asks what are you talking about; interpretation asks
how you can say anything about it, how you can form propositions.
Statements are made or propositions are formed in accord with what passes
as authentic evidence, what Plato called "the really real." There are four
basic possibilities. Either the real can transcend the phenomenon, as it does
for Plato (an ontological interpretation) or it can underlie the phenomenon,
as it does for Freud (an entitative interpretation). In both cases, one distinguishes between the apparent and the real. For the ontological interpretation
this distinction becomes that of the phenomenon and the real; for the
entitative, this distinction becomes that of the surface or symbolic and the
actual substratum. On the other hand, one can maintain that the real and the
phenomenal are not to be so distinguished, that in some way it is the real that
is phenomenal. This can be either because, as for Aristotle, the essential is
the structure of the real (an essentialist interpretation) or, as for Andre Gide,
human perspectives confer on the phenomena whatever meaning and value it
possesses (an existentialist interpretation). In Aristotle, the intellect's activity
does not give the structure to the real, does not confer its essential patterns,
but it does make those patterns intelligible. In the existentialist interpretation of Andre Gide, on the contrary, it is perspective that constitutes the
real, giving it intelligibility as well as structure. How one "interprets" the
real, i.e. as transcending or underlying the given phenomenon or as merging
either essentially or perspectively with the phenomenon, will provide the
warrant for any statement. Interpretation indicates the final evidence on
which judgments will be formed, and a difference in interpretation dictates a
radical difference in judgments. Selection exhibits what the discourse has
taken as subject; interpretation allows predicates to be joined to that subject.
Third, there is method. The word itself has an interesting history. The
fundamental metaphor in p,e0o6og is 6665, a way, road, or journey. Burnet
maintains that it was taken originally from hunting, and Liddell and Scott
give the "pursuit of a nymph" as one example of this sense. Richard
Robinson, noting that only in the Sophist do hunting and ^iE0o6og come
together, maintains that it is "more likely that the word came to have its
technical meaning through Parmenides' 'way,' which was not a hunt or a
pursuit of anything, but a pilgrimage to the presence of a goddess."59
Etymologically, ^ie6o5og means the "way after" something, and Robinson
argues that by the time of Plato and Aristotle the journey or search was
purely intellectual, translating it with the English derivatives "method,"
"inquiry', "procedure," or "pursuit."
In any case, method indicates a pattern of discourse, a way of procedure, a
manner of argumentation in which one is able to move from one proposition
to another. Method is indicated by the way that one raises a question,
establishes evidence, argues from evidence to conclusions, or verifies the
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conclusions tentatively accepted. Selection is a coordinate of discourse
because discourse must have that which allows real predication; method is a
coordinate of discourse because there must be a pattern to such movements
as inquiry, proof, demonstration, and verification. Method allows the question: How is something done, established, composed, or contradicted?
Method is the pattern within discourse.
The history of reflective discourse, whether philosophic, scientific, literary, historical, or theological, is rich in the possibilities and varieties of
methods it exhibits. Some methods have been proposed as universal, as the
single method or pattern appropriate to all serious discourse. The dialectical
method of Plato and of the tradition which reaches from him to Hegel and
Marx is the only method "that attempts systematically and in all cases to
determine what each thing really is."60 It moves through negation to resolve
contradiction in a higher unity. The operational method of Galileo and
Bacon lies in the elaboration of an initial matrix or series of distinctions or
perspectives and in the bringing of this structure to bear upon any matter in
question in order to achieve conclusions whose validity can subsequently be
tested. Still other philosophers have proposed a series of differing or particular methods. The problematic method of Aristotle, Aquinas, and Dewey
distinguishes a different method for each different kind of problem; much of
the work of inquiry consists in discovering the method appropriate to the
question to be treated. Finally, from Euclid to Newton to Santayana, the
logistic method consists in breaking composites down to their simple
elements and then synthetically recombining them, for the whole is nothing
but the sum of its parts.
Each of these methods is modified and radically altered as it combines
with the other coordinates of discourse, but the isolation of method as one
of these coordinates allows an identification of the pattern which the
discourse is taking, either initially, to establish questions and evidence, or
subsequently, to formulate illation and verification. To ask the question
about method is to inquire how it is that this text or this argument embodies
coherence and pattern.
Finally, since human thought and speech must have its beginning, principle addresses the fourth question: What holds the whole together as the
source of so much diversity? The principle is the source of the discourse, of
its truth, its value, or its connection with reality. The question of principle
probes for what is ultimate in the presuppositions that so many elements
would be combined into what is one play, or that so many conclusions could
follow in thirteen books of geometry.
Philosophic history contributes very different kinds of principles to the
unity of discourse. For some philosophers, such as Plato or Newton, one
single principle (a comprehensive principle) will be the source of all explana-
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tion, whether that comprehensive principle is the relationship of being to
becoming as knowledge to opinion or whether it is the motive force to
which all movement and natural phenomena can be resolved. For others,
such as Aristotle and Descartes, the principle in each case is reflexively
commensurate with a particular science or area of problem, a reflexive
principle. In physics, Aristotle could have nature as a principle, as the source
of movement in something which is intrinsically moved; in metaphysics, he
could explain generation and corruption by thought thinking itself; he
explains predication, finally, through categories which are predicates of
predicates. For still others, the principle would be simple, that is, the parts of
a whole, the "simple ideas" of Locke or the individual atoms of Democritus.
Finally, the principle could be actional as Marx introduced revolutionary
activity into the Hegelian dialectic as necessary for continual progress or as
William of Ockham made the act of creation the arbitrary source of all finite
reality.
The necessities of significant discourse are: a subject and terms of discourse, a reality which makes predication possible, a method by which these
propositions can become an argument or an inquiry, and a source by which
the discourse can be said to be fundamentally true or valuable or unified.
Selection, interpretation, method, and principle, used as the coordinates of
discourse, provide a way not of categorizing an author or his work arbitrarily, but of asking questions about a work which brings out its unique
procedure. "With their aid, contrasts or corroborations can be asserted, and
the real issues of disagreement can be separated from verbal contradictions
or philosophical complementarities/ 161
Atheism, then, discloses four parameters by which its ambiguity can be
clarified and its claims be made the subject of a consistent inquiry. These
parameters dictate both the content and the method of the following inquiry
into the origins of modern atheism.
Because atheism is parasitic on theism for its name, its meanings, and its
adversary, it is imperative to investigate theism, its use of god, those who
constitute the "theists," and so on. Because atheism suggests a dependence
upon theism even for its generation and existence, it is imperative to
investigate the transition in which theism gives way to atheism. This problem constitutes the question of this book. Since the form in which this
content emerges is critical to its meaning, it is imperative to analyze the
working inquiries in themselves and to notice the shifts from one mode of
thinking to another, such as from theology to philosophy, and from one
form of philosophy to another. Since both atheism and theism emerge as
discourse, it is imperative that some attention be paid through the coordinates of discourse to those differences and interrelations of terms and
meaning in which problems are raised and solutions offered. It is not that
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one of these imperatives should be followed, completed, and another then
engaged. All these imperatives function together to form the structure of this
inquiry. The parameters of atheism frame the question which will govern
this book: How did the idea of atheism emerge in the modern world and
take so firm a hold?
The Event and Its Inquiry
If "atheism" without parameters is not a problem, "modern" without
qualifications is not a period. Cassiodorus' Variarum libri refers to the
institutions or things of the present as the moderna, and one current usage
has repeated this by identifying modern and contemporary. The word is
postclassical in its Latin origins, derived from modoy "just now," as hodiernus was derived from hodie, "today." Cassiodorus employed it to segregate
a later civilization from that of the antiqui, "ancient."62 The word traveled
from sixth-century Latin into French, Spanish, Portuguese, Italian, and
German that flowed as tributaries from this original source. Its designation
of a distinction from the past allowed periodic advancements or struggles in
education to be characterized as battles between the ancients and the
moderns. Vituperations between the "ancients" and "moderns" were exchanged by fourteenth-century logicians, the Thomists and the Scotists
classified with those who followed the via antiqua and William of Ockham
heading the moderni.63 In 1585, Thomas Washington distinguished the
"writings of the auncient and moderne Geographers and Historiographers,"
while Francis Bacon predicted to Tobie Matthew in Spain that "these
modern languages will at one time or other play the bank-rowtes with
books."64 By the early eighteenth century, the battle had become one over
humanistic learning in general, pitting against Richard Bentley the satire of
Jonathan Swift's Full and True Account of the Battle Fought Last Friday
Between the Ancient and the Modern Books in St. James's Library (1704).65
While "modern" has been contrasted with "ancient" since Cassiodorus, it
has come increasingly to be distinguished from "contemporary." The Oxford English Dictionary notes as obsolete a once-accepted meaning,"being at
this time; now existing," despite frequent sixteenth-century usage. "Modern" is more generous in its meanings now: "of or pertaining to the present
and recent times," and in historical studies it denotes that period which
begins after the medieval.66 Some authors speak of the twentieth century as
introducing the "post-modern world," and terminate the modern period
with the end of colonialism, the emergence of atomic energy, the decline of
Europe, the unifications of mass communication and transportation, or a
particular turn in world consciousness or philosophic focus. James Collins
opens his magisterial God in Modern Philosophy with the distinction be-
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tween "the modern history of the problem of God and contemporary
speculation about Him," and in two other works he confines the range of
modern European philosophy to the three centuries between 1600 and 1900,
while insisting that there is always something extrinsic and arbitrary about
such boundaries in the history of thought or in the actions and persuasions
of human beings.67
The overlapping of boundaries, the consequences of rereading ancient
authors and former accomplishments and of their retrieval through new
exegesis and commentaries, the parallel but independent streams of traditions which intersect at unexpected, unforeseen junctures, the interventions
of genius and the misinterpretations by the faithful disciple,—all of these
make any simple sequencing or sectioning of the history of philosophy or
theology finally false. The series over time is true enough at first blush, but
the interconnections of influences and inquiries render any dispersal over
time or within a period only initial and tentative. It is true to say that
Thomas Aquinas preceded David Hume by hundreds of years and held sway
in a profoundly different philosophic and theological culture. It is also true,
however, and perhaps even more accurate, to urge that Aquinas and Hume
are intellectual contemporaries; part of the hermeneutical task is to overcome the historical and linguistic distance between them so that their
concerns about god, freedom, causality, and understanding can be mutually
related, differentiated, and criticized. In other words, it is banal to note that
the procession of figures moves successively through the history of thought;
the part of wisdom is to find a continual conversation taking place, a
conversation to which each generation makes its contribution and from
which it derives its tradition as it evokes from the older members latent
insights and discoveries which emerge only during this continued encounter.
Chronology is appropriate in intellectual history, but it is not the final word.
Nevertheless, it is a word that should be spoken. It is one thing to insist
that wisdom is sempiternal; it is another to argue that it is static. Philosophy
and theology contain events of inner development in which the initial
principles of a system are allowed time for the maturation and emergence of
their organic consequences. Often the master has not spelled out these
conclusions of initial presuppositions; it is a task done within and over
history. History seems in this sense to be the laboratory for ideas and
assumptions. What lies hidden in the presuppositions only develops as the
conversation continues; what is false or misleading is often recognized only
when a hypothesis finally fathers a conclusion that is untenable. The history
of philosophy or the history of theology in this sense is part of philosophy
or theology in a distinctive manner. The verification principle for theoretic
investigations often lies in the irreversible sequel of their presuppositions—
not that these can be established as true by their conclusions, but they can be

Introduction

27

established as false by them. A true conclusion can come from a false or a
true premise; a false conclusion can come only from a false premise. And
when a philosophic or theological conclusion does not explain reality, but
explains it away or contradicts something unquestionably established, the
premises under which the inquiry was conducted become problematic. The
conclusion translates what the assumptions mean; it spells out their implications. An assumption it is a statement about the world, and eventually the
world will be formed which tells you what you have said. A plot must have
an organic beginning, middle, and end, but the beginning will only deliver its
latent sense when the end has been reached. The beginning is only a
beginning because there is an end. In philosophy or theology, the plot is an
inquiry or an argument, which also needs time to disclose the full power and
significance of its principles, for these principles are only understood in their
conclusions.
Within what is now called the modern period, a new conclusion appeared.
It was not a judgment about atheism or books about atheistic doctrine, nor
about adversaries who were judged atheists. The conclusion was that there
were men who judged themselves to be atheists, who called themselves
atheists. In the ancient world, and even more in the medieval world, this was
unheard of. "Atheist" had been vituperative and polemic; now it became a
signature and a boast. David Hume commented casually that he had never
met an atheist, as John Duns Scotus or Aristotle might have said before him.
But Baron Paul d'Holbach did what no one had done with Duns Scotus or
Aristotle: he introduced Hume to a society he claimed to be filled with
them!68 Paris boasted what medieval Oxford and ancient Athens did not
command: a band of thinkers who celebrated their denial of anything which
one could call "god."
Hegel recognized that something distinct had occurred in the Paris of the
Enlightenment: "We should not make the charge of atheism lightly, for it is
a very common occurrence that an individual whose ideas about God differ
from those of other people is charged with lack of religion, or even with
atheism. But here it really is the case that this philosophy has developed into
atheism, and has defined matter, nature, etc., as that which is to be taken as
the ultimate, the active, and the efficient."69 Hegel was correct in recognizing that something new had occurred. What he could not know was that this
persuasion of a very few would wax throughout the next century and
increasingly become the mark of an elite. The opening of the twentieth
century found that number swollen to a few hundred thousand, but it
increased by 1985 to over two hundred million. (If one includes those devoid
of any religious belief or interests, the total is over a billion, more than
twenty percent of the world's population.) What began in Paris reached this
extent in only two hundred years.70 Some twenty years ago, Professor
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Schubert M. Ogden registered his agreement with the German theologian
Gerhard Ebeling that our culture is characteristically "the age of atheism,"
and explained his agreement in terms of context and alienation: "If the
reality of God is still to be affirmed, this must now be done in a situation in
which, on an unprecedented scale, that reality is expressly denied." Karl
Rahner in his interview with Gwendoline Jarcyk spoke of world atheism as
"un phenomene qui jusqu'a present n'a jamais eu cette extension dans
1'histoire de Thumanite. . . . Une telle realite, voila qui n'a jamais existe
jusqu'a present." What began in the Paris of the Enlightenment has become
a religious phenomenon which Western civilization has never witnessed
before. It is critical to notice the historical uniqueness of the contemporary
experience: the rise of a radical godlessness which is as much a part of the
consciousness of millions of ordinary human beings as it is the persuasion of
the intellectual. Atheisms have existed before, but there is a novelty, a
distinctiveness about the contemporary denial of god both in its extent and
in its cultural establishment. The recent judgment of John Paul II coincides
with these readings of the present situation: "L'atheisme est sans conteste
Pun des phenomenes majeurs, et il faut meme dire, le drame spirituel de
notre temps."71
This massive shifting of religious consciousness was recognized as the
nineteenth century drew to a close by men as diverse as John Henry
Cardinal Newman and Friedrich Nietzsche. In 1887, after Nietzsche had
published the initial edition of The Gay Science and followed it with Thus
Spoke Zarathustra and Beyond Good and Evily he returned to the prior work
to complete it with the great fifth book. Earlier, the Madman in the
marketplace had announced the death of God. Now Nietzsche spelled out
the precise meaning which this striking parable carried: "The greatest recent
event—that 'God is dead/ that the belief in the Christian god has become
unbelievable—is already beginning to cast its first shadows over Europe. For
the few at least, whose eyes—the suspicion in whose eyes is strong and subtle
enough for this spectacle, some sun seems to have set and some ancient and
profound trust has been turned into doubt."72 In England, the aging Newman felt the same drawing on of night, the same shadow lengthening over
what had once been Christian civilization. In the Apologia Pro Vita Suay he
wrote of the religious disintegration of Europe: "In these latter days, in like
manner, outside of the Catholic Church, things are tending,—with far
greater rapidity than in that old time from the circumstance of the age,—to
atheism in one shape or another. What a scene, what a prospect, does the
whole of Europe present at this day . . . and every civilization through the
world, which is under the influence of the European mind!"73 For both
Newman and Nietzsche, this gradual but profound erosion of religious
belief, an erosion not halted but promoted and embodied in the liberal
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attenuation of dogma, constituted a massive cultural phenomenon, the
emergence of a certain cast of mind in greater and greater predominance, one
whose sensibilities and educational background, whose ambit of intellectual
interests and engagements, defined human beings constitutionally unable to
believe, to know, or to be convinced in any way of the existence of the
Judeo-Christian god. What Nietzsche and Newman foresaw was that religious impotence or uninterest would not remain a private or an isolated
phenomenon, that it would increasingly characterize the "educated intellect
of England, France, and Germany," and that its influence would eventually
tell upon every routine aspect of civilization.74 Both Nietzsche and Newman, albeit with vastly different evaluations, gauged the enormous importance of what was taking place, and in their assessments they stand as
prophetic figures within the twilight of the nineteenth century.
In the oft-repeated scene from the third book of The Gay Science, when
the Madman lights a lamp in the day and rushes screaming into the marketplace, it is the Madman alone who cries out: "I seek God! I seek God!" The
marketplace convulses in ridicule: "Has he got lost? asked ope. Did he lose
his way like a child? asked another. Or is he hiding? Is he afraid of
us? ... Thus they yelled and laughed." The difference between the Madman
and the market crowds was not that one believed in the reality of god and the
other did not. Neither believed, and god died in the event of his own
incredibility. But the Madman alone knows what they have done, what they
have lost. "I will tell you. We have killed him—you and I. All of us are his
murderers. But how did we do this? How could we drink up the sea? Who
gave us the sponge to wipe away the entire horizon? . . . What was holiest
and mightiest of all that the world has yet owned has bled to death under our
knives." Here the Madman falls silent before the astonished listeners. He
throws his lantern upon the ground, smashing it into pieces. "I have come
too early, he said then; my time is not yet. This tremendous event is still on
its way, still wandering; it has not yet reached the ears of human
beings. . . . This deed is still more distant from them than the most distant
stars—and yet they have done it themselves."75
In his lectures with Paul Ricoeur, Alasdair Maclntyre maintains that the
characteristic of the contemporary debate between the atheists and the
theists is the decline in the cultural urgency of the question. It doesn't make
any difference. The tension between religious belief and unbelief in the
nineteenth century, which one can trace in the lives of Matthew Arnold and
Henry Sidgwick, cannot be found in contemporary culture.76 But this is to
miss much of the point of Nietzsche's myth. It is precisely the absence of
this tension within the latter-day nineteenth-century marketplace which
convinced the Madman that human beings do not understand what they
have done. Two things were poignantly obvious to Nietzsche: that the
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incredibility of god within the bourgeois world constitutes his death, and
that this was the elimination of a god radically unimportant to those who
clustered there. The god who had disappeared from conviction was finally
irrelevant.
Nietzsche never draws out the implication of these two insights, but they
are points of critical importance. For if the death of god is constituted by his
massive incredibility and if this incredibility rests upon one who is fundamentally trivial, then the issues of the Seventh Epistle about meaning and
instance can be legitimately leveled at the Madman of The Gay Science and
the prophetic Zarathustra: What god has died beneath these knives? What is
the content of theological meaning and the instance of its embodiment which
has perished?
But Nietzsche's Madman does pose a central question, whose import
bears more upon the modes of thought or the forms of discourse than upon
the content: "We have killed him—you and I. All of us are his murderers.
But how did we do this?"77 The Gay Science sketched a very general answer
by tracing out the history of science and morality, but the question still
hangs on the air. How was it possible that such an event came about? The
question of the Madman is not about cultural disappearance, as some have
argued; much less is it a return to some lighter version of Hegelian projection into otherness through the incarnation. Nietzsche himself specified its
meaning: God has become incredible. What was once the content and
subject of unhesitant conviction and religious confession has become unwarranted. It is not that Europe has stopped defending or believing in the
Christian god. The statement is not about Europe, but about god, about the
transition from being credible to becoming incredible. This transition has
been made, but it will take centuries for Europe or for the world to accept it.
"In the main one may say: The event is far too great, too distant, too remote
from the multitude's capacity for comprehension even for the tidings of it to
be thought of as having arrived yet. Much less may one suppose that many
people know as yet what this event really means."78 Nietzsche's Madman
and Zarathustra announce "this tremendous event" itself: the transition into
incredibility, as belief in the Christian god became unbelievable, which
demands inquiry. What is this transition, this event still so far distant from
most human beings?
When a judgment so recent in its earliest proponents and so massive in the
contradictions it offers to religious consciousness gathers force and adherents so swiftly that within two hundred years it commands the convictions
of numerous major thinkers in the West and the attention of all, the event
out of which it issued legitimately and urgently claims examination. Something crucial has happened in the realm of ideas.
Atheism cannot be dismissed simply as an epiphenomenon of the social
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order or as an understandable psychological maturation or, conversely, as
another symptom of moral degeneracy. Whether it measures a remarkable
advance in the revolutionary arrangements of social classes; or emerges in
the conversion of common interests from the transcendent to the exploration and conquest of this world, a conversion for which enthusiasm is fed
with heady advances in technology and science; or whether it appositely fits
a world of comforts and alienation undreamed of by our ancestors, the
disintegration of monogamous marriage, the widespread industry in death,
the rise of totalitarian governments, and the recent nihilism of total war,
atheism remains a judgment, a statement about the nature of things. What is
more, it is primarily a religious judgment, whether that "religion" adopts the
form of natural or revealed religion, of philosophy or humanism. As a
religious judgment, atheism possesses its own plot, its own argument in the
history of ideas, its own demands for coordinated inquiry. To postulate that
religion arose and held its sway because of an ill-ordered society or an
ill-ordered psyche was an option indulged in the nineteenth century, just as
atheism had been reduced in earlier polemics to a collapsing social order or a
guilty conscience. All of these hermeneutics have claimed their advocates
and yielded diverse readings of the cultural histories they attempt to explain,
yet all of them explained a conviction through its genetic occasion. But
genesis and development exhibit the meaning and truth of ideas and of
judgments only if the theoretical motives which justify these concepts and
statements integrate that history and are submitted to an appropriate criticism. The empirical necessities of the irrigation of the Nile Delta may well
have been the social and economic occasion for the formation of the early
geometries, but this agricultural genesis says nothing about the truth of the
theorems elaborated or the accuracy of the corollaries drawn. How an idea
emerges from society or from interior and unconscious states is one question. Whether an idea is valid in both its content and its form of thought is
quite another. The genesis of a conviction is philosophically or theologically
critical to its understanding if the idea is not reduced to a social product or a
psychic inevitability, that is, if it is not explained or explained away by
contraction to something else, if the ideational integrity of idea, argument,
facts, and principles is kept and submitted to a history and a critique on its
own terms. Affirmation and negations have a right to be judged on their own
evidence and traced out in their own presuppositions and sequels. Social
histories and psychological analyses are rich in the illumination they provide, but they finally impoverish if they reduce the central judgments
studied to symptoms of myriad hidden factors and refuse to take a conviction seriously enough to consider it in itself, with its own content and forms
of appropriate discourse.79 A doctrine so defrauded of its proper coordinates
in history and in evidence becomes an ideology only symptomatically
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interesting: its metaphysical persuasions have only a subjective character and
the influences which bring it about are seen as independent of all reasonable
grounds and working with blind necessity. It is an idea alienated from its
own grounds and argument.
This book proposes to investigate the origin of an argument, to explore
the beginnings of a plot, not to follow its development through the great
dramatis personae of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries or through the
shifting patterns of the evidence then alleged and the methods employed.
The question for this inquiry is prior to that development. What lies at the
origins of modern atheism? How was it that over the period which Owen
Chadwick has called "the seminal years of modern intellectual history" one
of the seeds which germinated and flourished was that of atheistic
consciousness?80
To this question the prior parameters of an inquiry into atheism must be
brought. To understand the origins of atheism as an idea rather than as a
cultural by-product, it is necessary to track the theisms out of which it came
and to which it considered itself a counterposition. This job may not be
prohibitively difficult if we begin with the great work of Baron Paul Henri
d'Holbach, to which this comprehensive promoter of philosophic atheism
brought the conversations of his friends, and by which he turned the long
journey of Denis Diderot into system, the Systeme de la nature. The Systeme
unquestionably deserves the assessment which succeeding generations have
made of it: "the most important demonstration of materialism and atheism"
until the middle of the twentieth century.81 D'Holbach's book brought to
culmination the philosophes' religious cynicism, and it made even such
hardy patrons as Frederick the Great join the opposition with his Refutation
du Systeme de la nature and Voltaire enter the lists against it in his
Dictionnaire philosopbique. In the Systeme, the atheism of the Enlightenment had assembled its most careful argumentation and sounded its frankest
insistence upon the atheistic conclusion. One can begin with this work and
with the works of the philosophes out of which it came and to which it was
sequel and crown. Then the theisms that are being attacked are immediately
evident. Theology is considered in general confused and contradictory, yet
two theologians are singled out as of principal importance: Dr. Samuel
Clarke of England and Father Nicolas Malebranche of France. But both of
these theologians are descended from figures that dominated the European
philosophic and scientific world: Clarke sits at the feet of Newton and
Malebranche on every page bears witness to his extraordinary conversion to
Descartes. So d'Holbach and Diderot reached back to Newton and Descartes
for their principal opponents.
Certainly there were other figures who stepped on the stage at diverse
moments and who occupied it in more than a secondary role. Giordano
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Bruno anticipated Diderot's dynamic matter by a century and a half, while
the history of atheistic polemics could be written through the books composed to counter Spinoza. But Bruno and Spinoza were either too removed
from the discussions in natural philosophy or too intrinsically ambiguous to
form a concatenated series of disciples that advocated their heritage within
the Enlightenment. Spinoza drew the fire of both Malebranche and Clarke,
but it was not Spinoza's influence which told on Diderot and d'Holbach.
Descartes and Malebranche, Newton and Clarke generated a tradition in a
way that neither Bruno nor Spinoza did. These theistic traditions finally
generated their own denials/One of the many ironies of this history of
origins is that while the guns of the beleaguered were often trained on
Spinoza, the fortress was being taken from within.
The remarkable thing is not that d'Holbach and Diderot found theologians and philosophers with whom to battle, but that the theologians
themselves had become philosophers in order to enter the match. The
extraordinary note about this emergence of the denial of the Christian god
which Nietzsche celebrated is that Christianity as such, more specifically the
person and teaching of Jesus or the experience and history of the Christian
Church, did not enter the discussion. The absence of any consideration of
Christology is so pervasive throughout serious discussion that it becomes
taken for granted, yet it is so stunningly curious that it raises a fundamental
issue of the modes of thought: How did the issue of Christianity vs. atheism
become purely philosophical? To paraphrase Tertullian: How was it that the
only arms to defend the temple were to be found in the Stoa?
This question pushed the inquiry back to the guardians of the temple, the
theologians of the dawning seventeenth century. Two of them wrote elaborately and influentially against the atheists: Leonard Lessius of Louvain and
Marin Mersenne of the Parisian Priory. One was a Jesuit, the other a
Minim; both were scholars of immense erudition, and both took their
posts in the great intellectual battles that brought the modern world into its
initial configurations. Lessius and Mersenne shaped something of the intricate pattern which this new age was to assume; both of them told upon their
culture. But perhaps more important, both were symptomatic of forces and
persuasions more powerful than themselves and more pervasive than their
teaching. It is with them, then, either as influences in the history of thought
or as indications of its drift, that our story can begin. For these successive
questions, cumulating one on top of another, suggest this history the way
that history is always suggested, backwards. They arise from the religious
storm that broke over Europe during the Enlightenment and probe for its
origins, for beginnings which remained silent, unnoticed, a subtle drop in
the temperature and a change in the humidity, clouds forming far on the
horizon, stealing into the atmosphere and altering its climate, gathering

34

Introduction

moisture as almost imperceptibly they progress from albumen to slate gray
to black, the first few drops of rain, then the torrents and the earth awash
with water. From this, the governing question: How was it possible?
The emergence of modern atheism lies with Diderot and d'Holbach. This
fact seems uncontestable. The inquiry of this book does not establish that
fact; it presumes it. The problem for this book is how was such a fact
possible? It is not remarkable that an atheist or two or three would appear in
Paris. Almost anything will eventually appear in Paris! But how could such
an idea appear with force sufficient to initiate the massive negation which has
cast its shadow over Europe? Why could Nietzsche legitimately call this idea
a "tremendous event?" "We have killed him—you and I. All of us are his
murderers. But how did we do this?"82 This question expresses as well as
possible the problem of this book, an inquiry in agreement with Aristotle
that the one "who considers things in their first growth and origin, whether
apolis or anything else, will obtain the clearest view of them."83
Our effort, then, is to understand what has taken place as it emerged,
rather than mount an effort of advocacy or of attack. The question which
shapes this effort is twofold. In the generation of ideas, how did so powerful
an idea as atheism arise? In the reflections of theology, what can be learned
from such "a tremendous event"?
The first issue is one in the history of ideas rather than sociology, cultural
anthropology, or psychology. Human beings wrote works which advanced
ideas, urged convictions, appealed to evidence, and mounted arguments, and
these works evoked agreements which combined into an intellectual tradition unique in the history of Western civilization. They established a
community of meaning, even within clashing disagreement and violent
repudiation, for one of the ways in which human beings can come together is
to fight. Within the unity of this struggle may be hidden the possibilities of a
further or more comprehensive truth for whose realization these contradictions are necessary, dialectical moments. But whatever the outcome, the first
issue is that of the continuity, interaction, and genesis of ideas. The second
issue is directly theological, constructive in its inquiry and inductive in its
conclusions: Does this history of ideas exhibit anything that should bear
upon the reflections of the theologian and upon the design of theology? Gan
the theologian learn from history, especially the history of the contention
that the theologian has nothing to talk about? Granted that there is such a
pattern in the origins of atheistic consciousness, granted even that this
pattern is dialectical, that is, generated out of contradiction, what can
theology gain from the knowledge that this structure lies at the procreation
of atheism?
The task of hermeneutics is the restoration of communication, a fusion of
horizons in which significant works are made present and fruitful in their
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effective history, in which what is alien is made familiar and restored to
continuity, presence, and importance. Not only does the present ask of past
assertions and texts questions about meaning and truth, but this restored
tradition poses questions to contemporary reflection. Even the negativity of
such an experience implies a question. The origins of atheistic consciousness
place demands and challenges before contemporary theology, and perhaps
the ensuing dialogue can discover new significance in both.
The first issue, then, bears upon the establishment of a tradition; the
second, upon the discovery of its theological meaning. The inquiry is one of
tradition and discovery. For there is only an apparent contradiction between
discovery and tradition. The disclosure or the invention of what is new only
superficially excludes the transmission or reception of what is old. Actually,
discovery can only light upon what is hidden within the given, while a
tradition can possess significance, can perdure, only if that which is past is
continually made present, changed, reinterpreted, and transposed—if only
to be understood by succeeding generations. Discovery is the grasp of new
meaning; tradition is its mediation, posing the elements and the problematic
situation which enables new disclosures. Discovery and tradition are not
opposed; they are coordinated. They constitute the rhythm and the unity of
inquiry. Tradition embodies an evolving history, symbolic continuities,
resonances with varied human experiences. Discovery seizes upon a newness
of meaning or a retrieval of significance, but the matter of discovery is
tradition.
Discovery alone can have something hypothetical about its insights and
something abstract about that which stands as revolutionary or as untried.
Tradition adds time and development, consequences and implications,
within conflicting conceptual schemata until the idea becomes a topic in the
history of ideas and its propositions take on the flexibility of a theme. The
new idea is an abstraction; tradition gives the idea an effective history,
following its internal possibilities through the growth and testing of subsequent experience. In its initial invention, an art object or a literary work may
possess a richness unseen by its author. History traces the consequent
reflection of other minds and the cultural embodiment in different practices
to bring out these hidden virtualities.
A tradition in the history of ideas, then, presents theological discovery
with its own prior and repeated discoveries and verifications. Theology finds
in this consequent history a field of experimentation, a laboratory in which
its possibilities are elicited and tested. Tradition is this discovery in its
continued richness, with some of its developmental promises or sequels
realized. In this sense, tradition is the truth of discovery. Tradition confronts
the present with a depth that nothing less settled can match.
This is deeply true of theological reflection. One does not reach back into
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the past to resurrect figures and arguments. Vital traditions are the situations
of the present. Tradition is the contemporary presence of the past. It forms,
as it surrounds, both the issues which are raised and the subject who
questions. Theology and its research always stand within a tradition, not at a
distance from it. And the richness of its reflection depends upon its awareness of this tradition.
This relationship between tradition and discovery is critically important
to any understanding of atheism, perhaps especially so in an inquiry into the
theological meaning of its origins. For the Western world, as indicated
above, is presented now with a radically different state of the question.
Unlike any civilization or intellectual culture that has preceded it in the past
or accompanies it today, Western philosophical and theological reflection
now confront the denial of god no longer as a random option or as an
idiosyncratic philosophy, but as a heritage of two centuries. Atheism exists
now in the West with a length of lineage and with a comprehensiveness of
human commitments unlike anything which it has enjoyed before. Atheism
has become a tradition, rather than a revolution. It possesses its own reading
of the past as moments of crisis, insights, and a labored evolution towards its
present moments of freedom and rationality. The twofold task of this book,
then, is to trace out the origin of this atheistic tradition, or origin which is its
transition from theism to atheism, and to understand its theological significance.

